Altruism and Self-Interest in Democracies - by R Jankowski (Hardcover)

About the Book

"Individuals have little incentive to vote, acquire political information or contribute campaign funds, because their vote has very little chance of affecting the outcome of an election. Jankowski offers an explanation and evidence for political participation based on the fact that most individuals are weakly altruistic. Other proposed explanations of political participation (civic duty and expressive behavior) are not supported by the evidence, or fail to explain the many different forms of political participation, such as the acquisition of political information. Evidence is presented that liberals and conservatives are equally altruistic. Therefore, an explanation of why liberals and conservatives differ in their support of various government programs to help the needy is presented. Jankowski's analysis examines both the electoral and post-electoral phases of representative democracy. In the post-election phase, interest groups and elected representatives dominate the policy process. It is shown that altruistic individuals exert their influence primarily through public interest groups"--

Book Synopsis

Individuals have little incentive to vote, acquire political information or contribute campaign funds, because their vote has very little chance of affecting the outcome of an election. Jankowski offers an explanation and evidence for political participation based on the fact that most individuals are weakly altruistic.

About the Author

Richard Jankowski is Professor of Political Science at the SUNY at Fredonia, USA. He has also taught at the University of Iowa and University of Arizona, USA. He holds a PhD from the University of Chicago, USA. His areas of specialization are political behavior, political economy, comparative political institutions, statistics, and game theory. He has published widely in political science, sociology and economic journals. His current research interests include foundations of rational choice theory, institutional economics, the political economy of growth, central bank intervention in exchange-rate markets, and democratization.