Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy - by Paul Pillar (Paperback)

About the Book

In this book, Paul R. Pillar identifies and confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies. He revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, criticizing the 9/11 Commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. When it comes to reforming the current intelligence apparatus, Pillar encourages insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. He also proposes several principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.

Book Synopsis

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations.

In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge.

Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.

Review Quotes

[A] rich, useful, and important book.--Thomas Powers "New York Times Book Review"

A thoroughly documented, cogently argued work by an author with vast personal experience of his topic.-- "Kirkus Reviews"

A vigorous and hard-hitting insider's account, --Lawrence D. Freedman "Foreign Affairs"

Important and highly readable.... This is a book that should be widely read by both the public and policymakers.--Richard Harris "The Manhattan Mercury"

Pillar provides a telling and comprehensive new perspective from the inside.--Steve Coll "New York Review of Books"

Pillar's book is extremely detailed and informative, providing a better understanding of just how hard it is to be an intelligence professional in a world where all that matters is being wrong... once.--James M. Burcalow "Military Review"

This is a well-written effort by a former intelligence offer and academician. Hopefully, members of the national security community and their staffs will read and benefit from it.-- "Choice"

About the Author

Paul R. Pillar is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies of Georgetown University and at the Brookings Institution. He served in several senior positions with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council and is a retired army reserve officer. He is the author of Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy and Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process.