The Impact of Judicial-Selection Method on State-Supreme-Court Policy - (Contributions in Legal Studies) by Daniel R Pinello (Hardcover)
About this item
Highlights
- This unique empirical study investigates how the method of judicial selection significantly affects state-supreme-court policies in several important areas of law--business, criminal procedure, and family law.
- About the Author: DANIEL R. PINELLO is Assistant Professor of Government at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York.
- 248 Pages
- Political Science, General
- Series Name: Contributions in Legal Studies
Description
About the Book
This unique empirical study investigates how the method of judicial selection significantly affects state-supreme-court policies in several important areas of law--business, criminal procedure, and family law. After examining different theories and surveying the research about judicial selection, this comparative study of policies in six states--Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia--challenges current assumptions. The author finds that appointed judges prefer the interests of the individual over those of the state in criminal-procedure cases and are the most innovative in business law; that elected judges prefer the interests of the state over the individual; and that legislatively selected judges acquiesce to the policy preferences of other branches of government and are the most inactive in terms of policy initiation. For students and teachers in law, political science, and history; for lawyers and judges; for interest groups concerned about state policy; and for policymakers and other professionals concerned with American government and public administration.
Book Synopsis
This unique empirical study investigates how the method of judicial selection significantly affects state-supreme-court policies in several important areas of law--business, criminal procedure, and family law. After examining different theories and surveying the research about judicial selection, this comparative study of policies in six states--Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia--challenges current assumptions. The author finds that appointed judges prefer the interests of the individual over those of the state in criminal-procedure cases and are the most innovative in business law; that elected judges prefer the interests of the state over the individual; and that legislatively selected judges acquiesce to the policy preferences of other branches of government and are the most inactive in terms of policy initiation. For students and teachers in law, political science, and history; for lawyers and judges; for interest groups concerned about state policy; and for policymakers and other professionals concerned with American government and public administration.Review Quotes
"Pinello's research mounts a serious challenge to the widely held notion that selection system is not very relevant to policy outcomes....[It] makes a significant contribution because it shows us how to obtain answers to this decades-old question about the linkage between selection system and judicial policy."-The Law and Politics Book Review
?Overall, he finds relationships that confirm most of his hypotheses and support the claim that how judges are chosen makes an important difference in what they do on the bench. His discussion regarding legislatively selected judges as passive policymaking is especially interesting and suggestive since there are only three states that use this method of selection and there has been very little previous research on these courts.?-American Political Science Review
?Pinello's research mounts a serious challenge to the widely held notion that selection system is not very relevant to policy outcomes....[It] makes a significant contribution because it shows us how to obtain answers to this decades-old question about the linkage between selection system and judicial policy.?-The Law and Politics Book Review
"Overall, he finds relationships that confirm most of his hypotheses and support the claim that how judges are chosen makes an important difference in what they do on the bench. His discussion regarding legislatively selected judges as passive policymaking is especially interesting and suggestive since there are only three states that use this method of selection and there has been very little previous research on these courts."-American Political Science Review
About the Author
DANIEL R. PINELLO is Assistant Professor of Government at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York.