Superpowers and Revolution - by Jonathan Adelman (Hardcover)

Review Quotes

?This book attempts to discern the similarities of policy of the US and the Soviet Union when they intervene politically or indirectly during potentially revolutionary situations in other countries. The major case studies for the US are China (1945 to 1949), Vietnam (1961 to 1965), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1970 to 1973); for the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia (1945), Hungary (1965), Poland (1956 and 1980 to 1981), and Afghanistan (1979). Although most of the contributors are political scientists, they rank historical memories consistently among the most important reasons for intervention. Other reasons are: international context, view of the enemy', cost-benefit calculations, and shifting bureaucratic coalitions. Although cultural arrogance played a larger role in US interventions than Soviet, both superpowers lacked detailed knowledge of the political structures and personalities of the countries in which they intervened. The US and the Soviet Union have historically overestimated and distorted the threat to themselves of the revolutionary regimes, a position that increased the hostility of the object countries.... Upper-division and graduate collections.?-Choice

?When states which are deemed by one or both superpowers to be significant in the geopolitical balance of power erupt into revolution or local war, Washington and Moscow have decisions to make: to weigh the risks, costs and advantages of this course or that; to decide on action or inaction; to try to act together to contain the dangers or separately to exploit them. The contributors to this volume look into the problems of revolution and intervention by considering specific instances where the Soviet Union (in the cases of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Afghanistan) or the United States (in China, Vietnam, Guatemala, Chile and Iran) had such decisions to make. These studies are, for the most part, carefully and thoughtfully done, without great new revelations and with more sureness of touch, for obvious reasons, on the American than on the Soviet side.?-Foreign Affairs

"When states which are deemed by one or both superpowers to be significant in the geopolitical balance of power erupt into revolution or local war, Washington and Moscow have decisions to make: to weigh the risks, costs and advantages of this course or that; to decide on action or inaction; to try to act together to contain the dangers or separately to exploit them. The contributors to this volume look into the problems of revolution and intervention by considering specific instances where the Soviet Union (in the cases of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Afghanistan) or the United States (in China, Vietnam, Guatemala, Chile and Iran) had such decisions to make. These studies are, for the most part, carefully and thoughtfully done, without great new revelations and with more sureness of touch, for obvious reasons, on the American than on the Soviet side."-Foreign Affairs

"This book attempts to discern the similarities of policy of the US and the Soviet Union when they intervene politically or indirectly during potentially revolutionary situations in other countries. The major case studies for the US are China (1945 to 1949), Vietnam (1961 to 1965), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1970 to 1973); for the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia (1945), Hungary (1965), Poland (1956 and 1980 to 1981), and Afghanistan (1979). Although most of the contributors are political scientists, they rank historical memories consistently among the most important reasons for intervention. Other reasons are: international context, view of the enemy', cost-benefit calculations, and shifting bureaucratic coalitions. Although cultural arrogance played a larger role in US interventions than Soviet, both superpowers lacked detailed knowledge of the political structures and personalities of the countries in which they intervened. The US and the Soviet Union have historically overestimated and distorted the threat to themselves of the revolutionary regimes, a position that increased the hostility of the object countries.... Upper-division and graduate collections."-Choice

About the Author

elman /f Jonathan /i R. /r ed.