Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty - (Edinburgh Studies in Scottish Philosophy) by James Foster

About the Book

Book Synopsis

Is morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology or divine command?
This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's Defence of Duty. To make this case, the book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.

Review Quotes

The central thesis of James Foster's Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty is that Reid was mostly right -- and Hume mostly wrong -- about the nature of right and wrong. Anyone who dogmatically denies the objectivity of moral distinctions ought to read Foster's book; it is lucid, lively and wise.