The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism - (Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy of Religion) by Jim Slagle (Hardcover)

About the Book

"Contemporary discussions in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind are dominated by the presupposition of naturalism. Arguing against this established convention, Jim Slagle offers a thorough defence of Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) and in doing so, reveals how it shows that evolution and naturalism are incompatible. Charting the development of Plantinga's argument, Slagle asserts that the probability of our cognitive faculties reliably producing true beliefs is low if ontological naturalism is true, and therefore all other beliefs produced by these faculties, including naturalism itself, are self-defeating. He critiques other well-known epistemological approaches, including those of Descartes and Quine, and deftly counters the many objections against the EAAN to conclude that epistemological naturalism should be rejected on the grounds of self-defeat. By situating Plantinga's argument within a wider context and showing that science and evolution cannot entail naturalism, Slagle renders this most common metaphysical view irrational. As such, the book advocates an important reconsideration of contemporary thought at the intersection of philosophy, science and religion"--

Book Synopsis

Contemporary discussions in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind are dominated by the presupposition of naturalism. Arguing against this established convention, Jim Slagle offers a thorough defence of Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) and in doing so, reveals how it shows that evolution and naturalism are incompatible.

Charting the development of Plantinga's argument, Slagle asserts that the probability of our cognitive faculties reliably producing true beliefs is low if ontological naturalism is true, and therefore all other beliefs produced by these faculties, including naturalism itself, are self-defeating. He critiques other well-known epistemological approaches, including those of Descartes and Quine, and deftly counters the many objections against the EAAN to conclude that metaphysical naturalism should be rejected on the grounds of self-defeat. By situating Plantinga's argument within a wider context and showing that science and evolution cannot entail naturalism, Slagle renders this most common metaphysical view irrational. As such, the book advocates an important reconsideration of contemporary thought at the intersection of philosophy, science and religion.

Review Quotes

"This is the most powerful defense to date of Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Slagle deftly shows that our modern belief in naturalism conflicts with belief content, truth-value, and relevance thus rendering our cognitive processes unreliable. We can rationally accept evolution only by rejecting naturalism. A hugely important study." --Paul Herrick, Professor of Philosophy, Shoreline Community College, USA

"In this book, Slagle offers a careful and well thought out reconstruction and defense of Plantinga's proper function epistemology and, especially, his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). He defends various versions of the EAAN against a broad array of objections, including mine. In doing so, he makes the most thorough defense of Plantinga's EAAN that I know of. I highly recommend this book to anyone seriously interested in Plantinga's EAAN." --William J. Talbott, Professor of Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle, USA

"Like Anselm's ontological argument, McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time and many other celebrated philosophical arguments, Plantinga's Evolutionary Arguments Against Naturalism is as intriguing as it is controversial. Jim Slagle shows why. But he is not an innocent by-stander. He ably discusses many objections that have been brought against it. In defence of it. A must-read for everyone who is seriously interested in philosophical naturalism." --Rene van Woudenberg, Department of Philosophy, Vrije Universiteit, the Netherlands

About the Author

Jim Slagle is Adjunct Assistant Professor of Philosophy the University of Portland, USA.